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The Use and Abuse of Cross-Examination
In Relation to Expert Testimony:
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WARRE P. HnLL**
The purpose of this paper is to attempt a balanced evaluation
of the legal practice of cross-examination of the expert witness as
exemplified in a particularly well-known trial, with a view toward
differentiating the legitimate and illegitimate techniques that have
become well-embedded in the legal "art" and practice. This may not
have the result of getting my professional readers to be willing to
joyously submit themselves to what ofttimes proves a gruelling and
humiliating ordeal, but such sketchy elucidation of purpose may
serve the worthwhile end of encouraging understanding, in part at
least, of why lawyers continue to act like lawyers when they are
confronted on the witness stand with an imposing and learned
authority whose only wish is to speak the truth as he sees it. Why
should his deliverance not be taken ex cathedra by the jury? Why
all this petty animosity and imputations ad hominem officially
sanctioned in a proceeding that should be a dispassionate and
scientific inquiry into the existence or non-existence of certain dis-
puted facts? And especially, why do we in the legal profession
treat the expert so shabbily when we need him so dearly, and suf-
ficient deterrents already exist to keep him shy of the courtroom?
It is pretty easy to see why court appearance with its attend-
ant threat of vigorous cross-examination by opposing counsel is
usually an emotionally disturbing experience for the professional
man, be he physician, laboratory technician, theoretical scientist,
or engineer. First, the skilled witness is not accustomed to having
his views and objectivity put in question by someone not his scien-
tific peer - there is an obvious ego involvement in his personal
formulations and judgments. Self-respect cannot be diminished
without a consequent painful sensation. Secondly, the courtroom
situation is strange, artificial and seemingly arbitrary, and slightly
authoritarian in character. The judge towers over the witness like
a citadel of technicality. And lastly, there are obvious semantic
barriers, augmented by inhibiting procedural rules, which militate
against the establishment of an easy rapport with a lay judge and
jury. The degree of unpleasantness associated with a court appear-
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ance is of course further dependent on the personality and sophisti-
cation of opposing counsel. Although he is out to win his case rather
than to do justice in any absolute sense, enlightened self-interest
dictates against an impulsive headlong attack without planning or
specific purpose in mind. As seasoned trial practitioners have re-
peatedly admonished, "more often than not, the cross-examination
of a truly skilled or expert witness affords him the opportunity to
enlarge upon and emphasize his direct testimony."' Abusive and
purely destructive cross-examination may often supply its own
corrective. But this assumes, of course, that the honest, thoroughly
competent, and well-prepared witness can acquit himself adequate-
ly in the forensic rough-and-tumble of the courtroom. Not too many
experts have a flair or stomach for the game. The laboratory and
clinic not being notably conducive to production of such verbal
agility, there may even be a negative correlation between such
trait and real professional competence and integrity. And yet even
if the expert makes undeservedly a miserable showing, the collec-
tive heart of the jury may be compassionate enough to take his side
against the bully lawyer.
Only Satan himself can decry the exposure on the witness
stand of the mercenarily-motivated "professional witness" or the
pompous fraud, so I will assume in this discussion that the major
objection taken to present cross-questioning practices relates to the
impairment and distortion produced thereby in the evidence given
by the sincere, qualified and not consciously biased expert. If we
set up certain norms for the purpose of distinguishing abusive from
useful types of cross-examination, they cannot be those of the
scientific parley seeking to achieve a calm consensus, but must re-
flect the realities of the present institution of civil or criminal jury
trial. The parties in litigation being held responsible for appointing
the experts, it must come as no surprise to learn that they cus-
tomarily seek out only those whose opinions will favor their claim
or defense, with only secondary attention being given to the pros-
pective witness's professional qualifications to render such an opin-
ion. So although we will seek to determine whether and to what ex-
tent present techniques of expert witness cross-examination are
conducive to the ascertainment by the jury of the true facts in dis-
pute, we must accept some compromise in our standards in light of
the partisan position in which the experts are perforce placed, and
the notoriously low minimal standards of competency judically ex-
acted in most areas of expertise.2
I Busch, LAw AmD PRAC iCE iii Jurty TRIALS (1949) §396, p. 637.
2 Experience on the Continent has shown that especially in criminal mat-
ters, the element of bias is not totally eliminated by court appointment of so-
called neutral examiners. Ploscowe, The Expert Witness in Criminal Cases in
France, Germany, and Italy, 2 LAw "D CoNT.,oRARY Pitom.ms 504 (1935).
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Without dealing further in generalities,; let me descend to the
details of a portion of a recent federal criminal trial that became
the focus of both national and international attention -namely,
the case of the United States- versus Alger Hiss. What I intend
to analyse and interpret here is one controversy within the larger
controversy over the guilt or innocence of the defendant. About
the latter controversy I have nothing very new or incisive to offer.
My subject is the evidence given by the defense psychiatrist, Dr.
Carl A. L. Binger, and -particularly his treatment at the hands of
the capable prosecutor Thomas F. Murphy on cross-examination.
I select this-particular instance of -cross-examining an expert wit-
ness because" it :so well illustrates the uses and abuses of this prac-
tice and because it involved the application of. so many of the
commonly approved techniques which trial attorneys employ. In
addition it also.highlights the basic anomaly of lay appraisal of ex-
pert opinion.
Dr. Binger was 'called by the defense in both trials'of the
perjury charge." His expert testimony, as offered, was directed to
the credibility of the chief prosecution witness, David 'Whittaker
Chambers.'In the first trial before District Judge Kaufman, which
resulted inf a hung jury, Binger's evidence was held inadmissible
by the :cour. because, in its words; "the record is sufficiently clear
for the jury, using its experience in life, to, appraise the testimony
of all the -witnesses Who have appeared in this courtroom." In the
second trial Judge Goddard permitted Binger to testify, explaining
"that the value of psychiktry has been recognized. It is apparent to
me that the outcome of this trial is dependent to a great extent
upon the testiinbny of one man'-Whittaker Chambers. Evidence
of insanity is not merely for-the judge on the preliminary question
of competency but goes to the jury to affect credibility: 4 As is
well knowh, the secon trial resulted in a verdict of guilty. This
outcome is certainly not conclusive on whether the introduction of
the psychiatric tdsnimony as ill-advised or not, as we are unable
to fathonm the'thought processes of the jury. The question of the
vahie of this sort' of evidence has been much mooted in the pro-
fessional- literatifre since then. Many' of the people who are still
convinced of" the '& fndant's" innocence have deprecated it while
-
3
.Iiss' alleged !jerjury consisted in falsely asserting before a federal grand
jury. &n-the Sputhern District of New York on December 15, 1948 that (1) he
had never "turned over" any State Department documents to Whittaker
Chambers; and that (2) he had not seen the said Chambers between the date
of January-1, .1937 and the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities in the summer of 1948.
The accuser's side of the story is given in Chambers, Wwmass (1952).
4 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
S Bendiner, The Ordeal of Alger Hiss, NATION (Feb. 11, 1950) p. 123.
[VOL 15
1954] USE AND ABUSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 461
many, who are otherwise disposed with respect to the. merits of the
case, are generally in favor of the precedent established by the
evidentiary ruling in the second trial.6 If any alignment can be dis-
cerned, pro or con the Binger testimony, it is between lawyers and
psychiatrists, the latter holding that the good doctor may have
delivered his "profession a blow from which it may take 50 years
to recover."7 Modern lawyers, far from being resistant to scientific
enlightenment tend to grasp at any straw which they feel might
perhaps reduce the dreadful uncertainity of litigation. One dissent-
ing legal voice must, however, be noted- the Earl Jowitt in-his
book on the Hiss case prides himself on the fact that English trial
practice tolerates no such nonsense." In all fairness to Binger's
professional colleagues who thought he did the cause and the pro-
fession a disservice, it is observed that opposition stemmed not
from a reluctance to assist our courts in the evaluation of the
reliability of the mentally abnormal witness, but from a skepticism
regarding this witness's methods and diagnostic criteria.
In response to hypothetical questions, which took over an hour
to- recite, both Dr. Binger and psychologist Henry, Murray of
Harvard University concluded that Chambers was suffering from
a condition known as psychopathic personality, "a disorder of char-
acter the distinguishing features of which are amoral and asocial
behavior, with a tendency towards making false accusations." A
vast amount of time was expended in the examination and cross-
examination of these two witnesses - their evidence occupies near-
ly 450 pages of the transcript. Before turning to a discussion of
prosecutor Murphy's methods of impeachment, let me briefly touch
on the problem of admissibility and weight of this sort of evidence,
as an understanding of its medico-legal nature may help us decide
whether the conclusions of the behavioral scientists were accorded
their proper respect at the trial. Traditionally, a common law jury
is supposed to be able to detect the presence of falsehood by ob-
serving the demeanor of the witness on the. stand, and by balanc-
ing his possible motives for lying against his possible motives for
truth-telling. Opposing counsel on cross will presumably elicit dam-
aging disclosures of bias or interest, obvious defects in observation,.
recollection, and narration, prior inconsistent assertions, past felony
convictions, and possibly bring in community reputation for un-
veracity. These are extrinsic facts from which the jury will infer
6 See 11 ALA. LAWYER 212 (1950); 30 NEBa L. REV. 513 (1951); 1950 AmUmAL
SuRv= oF ArRicm LAw 804, 804-07 (N.Y.U. 1951); 59 YALE L. J. 1324 (1950).
7 Quotation from Ellen Johns in the NEw LEADER, January 14, 1950. See also
the disapproving view expressed in Guttmacher & Welhofen, PsvcwATRY Am
THE LAw (1952) c. 15, p. 364.
8Jowitt, THE STEPAxG CAse or AL=a Hiss (1953).c. XXI, p. 221.
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a subjective element of credibility or deception. But we can only
estimate what is going on in a man's mind by putting ourselves
in his position, insofar as this is possible. This is the common sense
way of arriving at some conclusions as to someone else's motives,
viz., identification. The premise here is that the personality dy-
namics of the witness in question are substantially similar to those
of the jury- mutual normality.9 But suppose that the witness is
apparently "different"; that although legally competent in the sense
that he is not completely out of touch with reality, he has certain
observable and well-recognized symptoms of mental derangement.
The jury expects now that the witness will be motivated in some
peculiar fashion not susceptible to the identification approach. The
identifying link is then consciously broken. Hence, other things
being equal, this lay body drawn from the general community,
will accord greater weight to the opinion of a psychiatric examiner
that such-and-such a mental condition, which has visible signs,
bears tellingly on the degree of probability that the "fact" witness
is telling the truth. The testifying psychopathologist here is il-
luminating a mental terrain which the average citizen has never
glimpsed, and assuming that the expert is technically qualified
and free from corruption and interest, the jury will normally ac-
cept his word as fact in their deliberations.
Now let us consider the witness with no manifest symptoms
of mental disorder, who can testify in a rational and coherent
manner and possesses intellectual attributes well above the average.
No one contends that the man is psychotic or in lawyer's parlance,
"insane" for any purpose, but opposing counsel do, let us say, con-
tend that he is a pathological liar due to a behavior disorder known
medically as "psychopathy." According to their behavior experts,
this disorder, if present, may impair social judgment and moral
responsibility to a greater degree than paranoia or other functional
mental diseases. The judge is faced initially with two problems:
(1) does such a condition exist-has it been medically sub-
stantiated? and (2) has sufficient observation and study of the
alleged psychopath been made so as to afford reasonable certainty
that the diagnostic label fits? On the first point the judge might
hold after perusing the relevant psychiatric treatises, that the sub-
ject matter, that is, witness credibility, is such that it can be ade-
quately handled by sound lay intelligence, assertion of the possi-
bility of superior expert handling being a delusion or an empty
pretense. To another judge, this clinical entity and its meaning in
relation to behavior, may have moved from the precincts of specu-
lation into the realm where experto credite holds sway.10 Logically,
9Cf. Alexander, F., Tm FuNDm=A S OF PsYcHoxAxLYsxs (1948) c. I.10 See Ladd, M., Expert Testinewy, 5 VanD. L. REv. 414, 417-21 (1952).
[Vol. 15
1954] USE AND ABUSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 463
because the present medical learning on psychopathic behavior is
so far outside common knowledge, the jury can less indulge its
common sense about human behavior and is more dependent on
expert help in drawing inferences from established data. Of course,
we know that the very opposite effect occurs largely because of
the common man's emotional resistance to psychiatry. What bol-
sters this popular antipathy to revelation of the mysteries of emo-
tional health, is the disagreement in this area even amongst the
medical workers themselves. Dr. Binger recognized this fact in
his book, More About Psychiatry (1949):
Much of what medical men say and write about is con-
troversial and is overlaid with strong feeling. This is in-
evitable in a living science. Disagreement exists chiefly in
the frontiers of knowledge. Where methods are empirical,
where experiment and predictability are not yet possible,
where scientific fact is unsupported by adequate theory -
there will be differences of opinion and disputation....
And especially is this true in psychiatry, where methods
are less precise, statistics hard to come by, theoretical
conceptions tentative. We disagree among ourselves- and
hotly, too- on such matters as psychoanalysis, shock
therapy, and others.
Even Dr. Hervey Cleckley, who has been in the vanguard in rec-
ognizing the "psychopath" as a profoundly disordered individual,"
admits that he "is not reluctant to grant that this disorder, viewed
theoretically, is a subtle one, and the psychopathology I suggest is
debatable and scarcely to be proved in courts."' 2 Psychiatrist Philip
Roche has argued that a diagnosis such as Binger made of Cham-
bers is little better than "name-calling" based as it necessarily was
(in view of the socio-pathic nature of the disorder) on value judg-
ments as to social behavior.' 3 It is a character defect, not an ab-
normality of personality. Possibly some day if psychiatry continues
to develop at its present rate, the matter of psychopathy will enter
the realm of general community knowledge so that even lay wit-
nesses can testify reliably about it (as they can now about "in-
sanity").
But if the trial judge decides that sufficient medical certainty
exists concerning the meaning of the diagnostic term "psychopathic
personality," he will still have to decide whether only clinical
observation of the witness whose credibility is challenged will suf-
fice as a factual basis for a competent opinion of this sort. Whether
a courtroom diagnosis based on data presented in court is feasible
1 See Cleckley, Tim MASK or SANTY (2d ed. 1950) passim.
l Cleckley, The Psychopath Viewed Practically, in HAxDBOOK OF Con-
tcCTIoNAL PSYCHOLOGY (Lindner & Seliger eds. 1947) p. 412.
13 Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert Testimony and the Impeach-
ment of Witnesses, 22 Pa. Bar. Ass'n. Q. 140 (1951).
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should probably be left for decision to the qualified psychiatrist.
At least he is better qualified than the jury to assess personality
disorders. Ideally in the Hiss case, the court should have been em-
powered to order clinical examination of the witness by a court-
appointed psychiatrist. Lacking this opportunity to interview and
examine Chambers, Binger could only express his opinion in re-
sponse to a hypothetical question reciting every incident, discredit-
able or considered suggestive of abnormality, developed in the de-
fense attorney's long cross-examination of Chambers and the testi-
mony of an old school friend; and based on his study of Chamber's
various writings and translations and his observations of him on
the witness stand.14 Ideally again, there was no reason why the
defendant should have been entitled to a highly selective summa-
tion of the most damaging parts of Chamber's testimony and the
odder aspects of his behavior -under section 9 of the Model Ex-
pert Testimony Act which attempts to remedy this abuse, Binger
would have stated his opinion as formulated from his attendance
upon the testimony given, but could be required on direct or cross-
examination "to specify the data on which his inferences were
based."''1 After answering the hypothetical in the manner pre-
viously indicated, Dr. Binger for a whole day drew telling analogies
between these symptoms and Chamber's known behavior and writ-
ings. Then began the jousting match with the prosecutor. Accord-
ing to the account of the trial by Francis X. Busch, Murphy "rose
to the occasion magnificently."' 6 Whether this handsome encomium
is justly deserved we will now attempt to determine by an analysis
of the measures he attempted to use for depreciation of the direct
testimony.
Binger from all accounts made a fairly effective witness for
the defense. He was poised and confident, and articulate if not
glib. He had had a brilliant career in medicine and was obviously
a man of great ability. A shrewd cross-examiner might have ap-
proached the challenge of his testimony in generally two quite
different ways. The first way, which was not followed, would have
been to assume a sympathetic and receptive attitude toward the
field of knowledge involved, with some display of respect for and
grasp of the field. The expert can then often deal with the lawyer
14Binger diagnosed Chambers as a psychopath largely on the basis of
twelve characteristics: 1. Repetitive lying. 2. Stealing. 3. Withholding truth.
4. Insensitivity to the feelings of others. 5. Playacting and assuming false
names. 6. Bizarre and unusual acts. 7. Vagabondage. 8. Instability of attach-
ment. 9. Panhandling. 10. Abnormal emotionality. 11. Paranoid thinking. 12.
Pathological accusations.
Is MoDEL ExPET T sTnmoxy AcT, §9, 9 UL.A.
1 6 Busch, GurmTY oR NOT GunAY? (1952) p. 275.
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in his own terms which can prove dangerous if the latter is only
superficially grounded in the subject matter. However, the well-
prepared lawyer can often by so doing demonstrate to the jury
that the expert has exaggerated his qualifications or has had little
experience with the particular type of case involved. Murphy
might have shown, for instance, that Binger's major training, re-
searches, and his chief experience had been in the field of internal
medicine, and that his knowledge of behavior disorders "smelled
of the library." While this might have been the indicated approach
in some accepted technological field, in psychiatry it plainly was
not. While -the jury might perhaps have been impressed by a dis-
play of erudition on the part of the prosecutor, utilized skillfully to
expose the speculative character of the science of psychiatry as it
relates to diagnosis and treatment of so-called "borderline" types,
what would be more emotionally satisfying to them would be a de-
bunking operation which tended to pander to their prejudices.
Murphy, of couse, may in all sincerity personally reject the findings
and insights of modern dynamic psychiatry. In any event, in the
words of Alistair Cooke, Mr. Murphy "asked no title more glorious
than that of representing the humble layman. And he stood for the
ordeal like Hamlet's Horatio, the time-honored punctum indif-
ferens, more commonly recognized in this country as the gruff,
genial, no-nonsense, all-American regular fellow."'17 Quite a few
of the prosecutor's more sarcastic sallies can only be attributed to
a distaste for the psychiatric profession in general, e.g., "Have you
been psychoanalysed?" And after Binger had alluded to certain
"extraordinary analogies between the Hiss-Chambers relationship
and the one between two fictional characters in a German novel
translated by Chambers, Murphy interjected rhetorically, "Did you
find any such analogies in the child's book Bambi?" (which Cham-
bers had also translated). But certainly a large number of the ques-
tions put by the government man to the psychiatrist were legitimate
in seeking to elicit valuable responses going to the weight to be ac-
corded the expert opinion evidence, and would have been proper
in any inquiry no matter how dispassionate and fair-minded. Take
the matter of interest which the doctor might have in the outcome
of the litigation. He was not being paid any fee, nor would he ac-
cept one if offered. His wife was associated in some educational
work with Priscilla Hiss. It is hard to say, as an abstract matter,
which kind of expert might show a greater want of scientific ob-
jectivity in his testimony- the selfless partisan of what appeared
to be a great liberal cause, or the courthouse medical mercenary
who works on a contingent fee basis. Because the hypothetical
questions contained only those factual assumptions favorable to the
17 Cooke, A GE1m~mAixN ON TW . (1950) p. 306.
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theory of the defense, it was certainly fair game to supplement the
hypotheses with additional facts, and ask for an opinion on the
hypotheses as modified. For example, Murphy showed that though
the doctor had read assiduously in the literary works of Chambers
he was unfamiliar with his more celebrated "cover pieces" done for
Time magazine. Binger had based his diagnosis largely on the basis
of twelve characteristics, such as repetitive lying, panhandling,
instability of attachments. When pressed the doctor could only
account for about "ten lies over a period of 33 years."' 8 There was
absolutely no evidence in the case that Chambers had cadged
money on the public streets - another symptom excused! Cham-
bers had been married to his present wife Helen for 18 years -
hardly consistent with the asserted inability to form stable attach-
ments. The expert had also made some errors in observation such
as the finding that Chambers rarely answered questions directly
but qualified his responses with phrases like "it would have been,"
or "it should have been." Actually, by count in the record, Cham-
bers had used one or the other of those expressions only ten times
in 770 pages of the official transcript, whereas defendant Hiss had
used them 158 times in 550 pages of testimony. If any exception
could be taken to Murphy's techniques on the score of purposeful
distortion, it would be to his method of attacking Binger's con-
clusion as unjustified by the facts assumed. The technique here
is to minimize the importance of each behavorial peculiarity which
was allegedly symptomatic of psychopathy.19 To no apparent avail
did the witness protest that he had to consider the totality of the
picture. "Judgment cannot be isolated according to specific parcels
of information." Yet the impression which the prosecutor was at-
tempting to create in the jury's mind was that if each factor stand-
ing alone is of no significance clinically, how can the sum of a
series of zeros rise to anything more appreciable. This method of
attack is especially devastating and correspondingly unfair in con-
nection with a diagnosis of psychopathy, which concerns pre-
eminently the whole life pattern or style of the individual and
does not derive support from the finding of any gross psychoneu-
rotic symptoms.20
I certainly do not wish to judge of the wisdom of Dr. Binger's
offering himself as expert in this type of case. As students of legal
18After exacting this admission from the Doctor, Murphy then queried:
"What's par for the course, doctor?"
19 E.g., "Now doctor, you stated in your direct testimony that one of the
behavioral traits on which you based your diagnosis was the witness' predilec-
tion for wildly hued and designed sport shirts. Now we all know that Bing
Crosby is given to wearing such apparel. In your opinion then, doctor, has
Mr. Crosby a psychopathic personality?"
2
o Lindner, R., Ramx WrrHoUT A CAUSE (1944) c. I.
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medicine, the question we must seek to answer is whether Binger
only slept in the bed he had prepared for himself, or whether cur-
rent legal rules and practices are so diabolically contrived as to
make all such experts look like fools in the public gaze. If I pre-
fer to believe the former, it is not because I think the whole
psychiatric project ill-conceived, but because in my view, the psy-
chiatrist must take his risks of popular ridicule if the important
job of enlightening the public concerning the "new psychology" is
to be carried on. Psychiatry, if it is to make any strides in mental
hygiene education must emerge from the clinic and analytic
chamber and submit itself to public cross-examination. The verbal
tilt between Murphy and Binger, on which was focused both na-
tional and international attention, clearly personified this great
issue of our day. While a few such skirmishes may be lost, by such
efforts the war may yet be won in terms of eventual widespread
understanding of the dynamics of humarn behavior.
CONCLUSION
Even though the Government called no psychiatrists of their
own to provide diametrically opposed conclusions as to the struc-
ture and dynamics of Chamber's personality, the problem of the
"battle of experts" was still involved in the second Hiss trial. Pitted
against Dr. Binger's tentative findings was the "four-square com-
mon sense" of the prosecutor. There is an obvious anomaly in per-
mitting a lay jury to resolve the conflict, as expert opinion is only
admitted when the triers of fact are confronted with issues which
cannot be determined intelligently on the basis of ordinary judg-
ment and practical experience gained through the usual affairs
of life. Almost a half century ago, Learned Hand suggested in the
course of a brilliant article,2' that the only way out of this paradox
was to establish an expert tribunal which would hear the com-
peting theories, reject the spurious or achieve a synthesis of views,
and then so advise the trial judge. These findings would pre-
sumably then be controlling on the jury.
Of the other techniques of cross-examination of an expert
highlighted by the Hiss trial, many are reasonably defensible as
aids to investigation. These would include technical attacks upon
training and special competency, and upon personal interest or
bias. An especially valuable purpose often pursued by the cross-
examiner of the expert witness who is personally immune from
impeachment, is the disclosure of additional but not necessarily in-
consistent medical data or propositions favorable to the opponent's
theory of the case. Here the cross-examiner really makes the
witness his own client's expert. Concedely there are absurdities
21 Hand, L., Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 H~nv. L. Rzy. 40 (1901).
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countenanced in the type of cross-questioning consequent upon use
of the so-called "hypothetical question," but the indicated reform
here is obviously complete abolition of "this monstrosity created
by the legal imagination." 22 Frequent complaint is also made of
the question-and-answer method of eliciting information from a
trained observer. Dr. Manfred Guttmacher found by means of a
questionnaire that many psychiatrists winced at being required to
reply to the questions which were given them by answering yes or
no, rather than being permitted to freely express their knowledge
and opinions.2 3 In justification, the lawyer might argue that only
thus can a truly responsive and legally competent expression be
secured; and further, that no qualifying information is permanently
suppressed as the doctor can signal his distress to proponent's at-
torney so that the total picture can be developed on re-direct ex-
amination. And mirabile dictu, Frederic Wertham thinks "it is a
godsend that there are at, least some situations where psychiatrists
are forced to give a simple answer to a simple question.'*
22 See White, W. A., zsAmrY Am Tms CmnmAL LAW (1923) p. 86.
23 Guttmacher, M. S., The Doctor in Court- Viewpoint of the Psychiatrist,
XI MAnIyL& L. REv. 305, 307 (1953).
2 4 Werthalii, F., A Psychiatrist Looks at "Psychiatry and the Law," 3
BUFrALO L. REv. 41, 48 (1953).
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